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How does one decide they have enough information to make a 
decision? Efficient sampling and evaluation of environments 
enhance the accuracy, efficiency and net benefit of choices, 
though this can come at the cost of energy, forgone opportunity 
and, in many species, exposure to harm and predation. Problems 
from sampling too little or too much information occur in a vari-
ety of psychopathologies. Examples include ‘jumping to conclu-
sions’ with insufficient information in psychosis (Dudley et al., 
2016), and sampling less information in depression (Tavares 
et al., 2007), Parkinson’s patients (Djamshidian et al., 2013), sub-
stance use disorders (Clark et al., 2006) and binge drinking 
(Banca et al., 2016). Increased information gathering is observed 
in patients with obsessive-compulsive disorder and individuals 
high on the compulsivity spectrum (Hauser et al., 2017a, 2017b). 
Formal experimental models of these biases provide insight into 
decision processes associated with these disorders and new tar-
gets for their treatments.
Information sampling relates to the psychological construct of 
reflection impulsivity – the tendency to make decisions without 
gathering and effectively evaluating information. Reflection 
impulsivity is dissociable from motor and temporal impulsivity 
forms (Caswell et al., 2015). In recent decades, it has been 
studied with the Information Sampling Task (IST; Clark et al., 
2006) and urn tasks (FitzGerald et al., 2015). In each, participants 
choose a quantity of information to sample, at a defined cost, 
before making a decision that will lead to a reward or penalty. 
The IST is designed to place negligible demands on visual pro-
cessing and working memory, and have an intuitive interface 
(Clark et al., 2006). It has multiple trials, each with a new grid of 
25 obscured squares concealing one of two colours. For each 
grid, a participant chooses to reveal as many squares as they wish 
until certain enough to make a choice of which of the two colours 
is in the majority for the board. Each sample detracts from the 
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potential reward (in the decreasing win condition of the IST) but 
increases the likelihood of a correct decision. These two compet-
ing accounts must strike an optimal balance. The switch from 
sampling to colour prediction relates to the explore–exploit 
learning theory framework. An individual explores the informa-
tion available before committing to a choice by exploiting this 
information (Averbeck, 2015).
Serotonin has received attention for links to various concepts 
related to information sampling: impulsivity in general (Dalley 
and Roiser, 2012), avoidance of aversive outcomes (Cools et al., 
2011) and risk preferences (Murphy et al., 2009). Murphy et al. 
showed that tryptophan supplementation reduced loss aversion in 
probabilistic decision making, while acute tryptophan depletion 
(ATD) manipulations have been shown to have effects on risk 
preferences in rats (Koot et al., 2012) and macaques (Long et al., 
2009). Crockett et al. (2012) specifically examined the effects of 
ATD on IST behaviour. Participants increased costly sampling 
when tryptophan (serotonin’s precursor) was depleted, while sam-
pling without cost was unaffected. It was posited that serotonin 
may reduce avoidance of local costs relative to the prospect of a 
future global loss. Similarly, in other contexts, ATD has been 
shown to increase deferral of complex decisions to make pur-
chases (Lichters et al., 2016). Comparable studies using clinical 
doses of serotonergic medication have not been reported. 
Serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SRIs) blockade the serotonin trans-
porter and inhibit serotonin’s reabsorption into the presynaptic 
neuron, and are widely used drugs for psychopharmacological 
treatment of depression and other psychopathologies. Citalopram 
is a highly selective SRI (Owens et al., 2001). Chamberlain et al. 
(2006) reported effects of acute citalopram on probabilistic rever-
sal learning. That research showed that a single 30 mg dose of 
citalopram impaired learning about a changing reward environ-
ment, increasing sensitivity to negative feedback. This line of evi-
dence led to our hypothesis that serotonin, by way of a clinical 
dose of citalopram, may also change learning in information sam-
pling contexts.
To contrast serotonergic effects with effects of other mono-
amines and employ an active control with a similar side-effect 
profile, we also tested a group with atomoxetine at a dose known 
to have behavioural effects. Atomoxetine is a specific noradrena-
line reuptake inhibitor that increases prefrontal noradrenaline and 
dopamine levels (Bymaster et al., 2002; Koda et al., 2010; 
Swanson et al., 2006) and is associated with improved inhibitory 
control (Chamberlain et al., 2009; Rae et al., 2016). It has been 
linked to lowered motor and temporal impulsivity (Bizot et al., 
2011; Chamberlain et al., 2006), but not the reflection subtype. 
The Chamberlain et al. (2006) study showed an effect of citalo-
pram on reversal learning but no effect of 40 mg atomoxetine, 
despite this dose being shown to enhance inhibitory control 
(Chamberlain et al., 2009), reduce fatigue and alter subjective 
sensations (DeVito et al., 2017). This dose also affects affect ran-
dom (but not directed) exploration in humans (Warren et al., 
2017).
Recent advances have also reformulated our modelling of IST 
decisions. From the point of view of the decider, the probability 
of a decision being correct on the IST with a given amount of 
information can be formalised as a Bayesian inference problem 
(Bennett et al., 2016; FitzGerald et al., 2015). Bayes’ theorem 
determines the optimal way to combine information from both 
the current environment (the likelihood) and previous experience 
(the prior). In the IST, this corresponds to a likelihood based on 
information available from the number of squares revealed of 
each colour on the current trial and a prior from true distributions 
of colours revealed on previous trials. A normative set of choices 
(an ideal observer) from these models can formulate an upper 
bound on an individual’s ability to predict outcomes effectively 
from gathered information. As real-life decision making is often 
suboptimal, this allows a quantification of how an individual or 
group departs from the ideal – a measurement of how effectively 
they can use existing information when deciding whether they 
have enough. While Bayesian approaches have been used to ana-
lyse decisions on this task (Axelsen et al., 2018; Bennett et al., 
2016), previous studies have not incorporated updating of prior 
expectations from previous trials. Participants are often instructed 
that each sampling board is independent of previous ones. 
However, it is our assumption that learning of likely underlying 
colour distributions from previous trials still occurs, especially as 
repeated trials inevitably reveal that more extreme underlying 
distributions (where the great majority of squares are of one col-
our) never occur.
We developed a variant of the IST designed to provide a 
clearer interpretation of the effects of pharmacological chal-
lenges on information sampling decisions. This IST variant uses 
purely positive or zero pay-offs to remove the possible interpreta-
tion of changes of loss aversion with respect to the net result of 
each trial. Use of the net result as the unit of measurement is a 
reasonable approach, given the short duration of the trial. 
However, aversion to local costs of a sample is still a possibility. 
We also introduced a fixed interval between the sampling and 
decision periods (rather than the participant choosing to decide at 
any point in time as in the original task) in order to negate tempo-
ral discounting interpretations (i.e. the tendency to sample less 
through impatience for receiving reward).
Finally, we introduced a new dependent measure that merges 
a normative view of decision making (i.e. whether it is better or 
worse from the point of view of the decider) with individual dif-
ferences of risk preference. Previous studies of the IST (e.g. 
Chamberlain et al., 2007; Clark et al., 2006; Crockett et al., 2012) 
used a measure of ‘probability of correctness’ to determine dif-
ferences between healthy and patient populations or between par-
ticipants on placebo and pharmacological manipulations. While 
this is an important aspect of a correct choice, it is limited in its 
ability to form a normative view. Differences in propensity to 
accept a given likelihood of being correct (or sample more) can-
not be assessed for their effectiveness unless a cost–benefit of 
sampling or choosing a colour can be formulated, incorporating 
changes in the net available reward (recall that each sample is 
costly). A simple approach could assume that decision makers 
seek to maximise expected value – the net reward available mul-
tiplied by the probability of being correct (determined by 
Bayesian inference). However, considerable evidence shows that 
most decision makers also exhibit risk aversion (Arrow, 1971; 
Dohmen et al., 2011; Holt and Laury, 2002) – we tend to prefer 
more certainty, even if that reduces our average pay-off. Expected 
utility is the subjective value of a gamble, that is, the value that 
an individual places on it based on their own preferences, incor-
porating their personal risk aversion (Von Neumann and 
Morgenstern, 1944). Changes in expected utility can therefore be 
seen as changes in the subjective value of a decision in relation to 
the individual’s preferences (assuming they remain fixed). So, to 
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model biases in models of reflection impulsivity, a normative 
conceptual framework should measure the expected utilities of 
participant choices.
For this study, we measured risk preferences in an independ-
ent task to incorporate individual differences of risk aversion in 
our analysis and calculate estimate individual expected utilities. 
We used the same baseline measure of risk preference in both 
conditions. Thus, this was not used to establish drug effects on 
risk aversion, and changes of choice expected utilities could also 
reflect effects of the treatment on underlying risk preference. In 
addition to expected utility, we used the probability of being cor-
rect for each choice, as in previous studies. In either case, the 
central dependent measures of this study reflect that participants 
take into account the informational content of the samples (i.e. 
how many of one colour compared to the other) to make their 
decision to sample more or not (Axelsen et al., 2018; Clark et al., 
2006). Each dependent measure was determined by two estab-
lished models and by a new model that incorporates experience 
with previous trials.
We predicted that citalopram would reduce the efficient use of 
information presented, in line with effects on learning in other 
environments. This would be demonstrated by lower expected 
utility outcomes and probability of being correct for decisions 
under citalopram compared to placebo. Conversely, unlike citalo-
pram, we predicted that atomoxetine would not affect informa-
tion sampling. As IST sampling is a directed strategy, that is, a 
strategy seeking information that can be used to obtain future 
reward (Wilson et al., 2014), no effect of atomoxetine would be 




Ethical permission was granted by University of Sussex Sciences 
and Technology C-REC (ER/JL332/6, ER/JL332/7). Potential sub-
jects were screened with a health questionnaire (see Supplemental 
Material) and the Mini International Neuropsychiatric Interview 
(MINI; Sheehan et al., 1998). Exclusion criteria included: age <18 
or >35 years; history of psychiatric disorder (including anxiety 
disorder, depression, eating disorder, psychosis and substance 
abuse disorder); presence of significant ongoing medical condition 
(including migraine, diabetes, epilepsy, glaucoma and hyperten-
sion); pregnancy or breastfeeding; currently taking any medication 
(excluding contraceptive pill); first-degree family history of bipo-
lar disorder; or MINI current indication of major depressive epi-
sode, manic episode, panic disorder, social phobia, OCD, PTSD, 
alcohol dependence, substance dependence, mood disorder with 
psychotic features, psychotic disorder, anorexia nervosa, bulimia 
nervosa, generalised anxiety disorder or antisocial personality dis-
order. Participants were also instructed to abstain from alcohol or 
caffeine in the 12 hours preceding the start of test sessions.
Fifty-three healthy subjects aged 18–35 years were recruited 
for this study: 28 for the citalopram group and 25 for the atomox-
etine group. Of those, one from the citalopram and two from the 
atomoxetine group did not complete the study due to adverse side 
effects, and the data of one participant from the atomoxetine 
group were excluded, as they took no samples in all but one of the 
trials. This left 49 participants: 27 for the citalopram group (11 
males, Mage = 23.4 years, SD = 4.70 years) and 22 for the atomox-
etine group (10 males, Mage = 23.1 years, SD = 2.93 years). The 
groups (citalopram and atomoxetine) were tested consecutively, 
and participants were aware in advance which group they were 
being recruited into. The groups were matched for age and sex. 
Subjects were tested on two sessions at least seven days apart 
(days between sessions M = 9.60, SD = 4.26). Assignment to treat-
ment order was double-blind and counterbalanced, with the drug 
treatment administered in one session and the placebo in another.
Procedure
Participants gave informed consent prior to the commencement 
of the first testing session, and were approved by a medical doc-
tor who assessed blood pressure, heart rate and medical history.
Doses in the drug treatment conditions consisted of 20 mg cit-
alopram/40 mg atomoxetine. These doses have been shown to 
elicit cognitive changes in previous studies (Browning et al., 
2007; Chamberlain et al., 2009; Grillon et al., 2007; Warren 
et al., 2017), and were chosen to balance active drug effects of 
interest against the potential for undesirable side effects.
Drug and placebo doses were delivered in gelatine capsules, 
indistinguishable from one another, with the capsule filled with 
microcrystalline cellulose (in addition to the active drug in the 
drug conditions). Drug and placebo doses were all manufactured 
according to Good Manufacturing Practice guidelines. No one 
who had contact with participants was aware of the treatment 
order, which was pseudo-randomised, balanced for sex and coded 
by a researcher who was not present during testing.
During the first session, following drug administration, par-
ticipants completed the risk preference elicitation (RPE) task 
immediately after the first dose but before the treatment was 
absorbed. They were also given visual analogue scales (VAS) at 
three time points: immediately following the dose, preceding the 
start of tasks and following the end of tasks. Scales (from 0 to 
100) were given to assess three somatic effects (nausea, headache 
and dizziness) and five emotion/arousal-related effects (pairs of 
antonyms: alert–drowsy, stimulated–sedated, restless–peaceful, 
irritable–good humoured, anxious–calm) to measure whether the 
drug was affecting these measures. To allow for drug levels to 
reach peak absorption (Milne and Goa, 1991; Sauer et al., 2005), 
the citalopram group commenced behavioural testing after three 
hours from the drug/placebo dose, and the atomoxetine group 
after one-and-a-half hours (aside from the RPE task – see below). 
They then carried out a set of tasks, including the Modified IST 
(mIST). Following the end of behavioural testing and the final 
scales, participants in the atomoxetine group were monitored for 
a further one-and-a-half hours, resulting in the same length of 
testing session for each group.
Tasks
RPE task. This task, adapted from Eckel and Grossman (2002, 
2008), was used to elicit the risk preferences of participants. Par-
ticipants were shown a list of gambles as in Table 1 and told to 
select their preferred gamble. They were informed that at the end 
of the session, a fair coin would be flipped to determine whether 
they received the low or high pay-off. The amount won was 
added to their participation fee. The choice of gambles was used 
4 Journal of Psychopharmacology 00(0)
to calculate a parameter of risk aversion r (details in Measures 
and Analyses). This measure was only given on the first session 
at the point immediately after drug/placebo administration, and 
so was used solely as a measure of baseline risk preference (i.e. 
unaffected by drug manipulation).
mIST. We designed a modified version of the IST (Clark et al., 
2006). Subjects were presented with a grid of 25 grey boxes, 
which concealed underlying squares in one of two colours, and 
they were told to open as many as they wished within a 15-sec-
ond interval before deciding which of the two was in the major-
ity. Each sample taken had a fixed cost, with a positive pay-off 
for a correct decision and no pay-off for an incorrect one. Ten 
trials were presented, with no instruction to the subject as to the 
underlying distribution of the numbers or locations of squares. To 
make the decision-dependent nature of task winnings more 
salient, potential winnings in monetary form (starting from £3.00 
and decrementing by £0.10 for each sample taken) were dis-
played to subjects during their sampling decisions. These oper-
ated solely in the gain domain (i.e. an incorrect decision resulted 
in no change, and a correct decision resulted in a positive pay-
off) to understand whether serotonergic effects were present 
where loss aversion was minimised (though loss aversion may 
still be present if zero outcomes are interpreted as loss). The sam-
pling time was fixed at 15 seconds, with a decision required at 
that time regardless of how many samples were taken in order to 
eliminate strategies to reduce task duration/time to reward. The 
true generative probability was a discrete uniform distribution of 
the majority colour occupying between 13 and 16 squares. Par-
ticipants were informed in advance that the winnings from one of 
the trials selected at random would be paid to them at the end of 
the study. The time course of the task is shown in Figure 1.
To test that sampling behaviour on the IST variant was similar 
to previous versions, we tested the mean number of samples 
against these values in five papers from the literature (Chamberlain 
et al., 2007; Clark et al., 2006, 2009; Delazer et al., 2011; Tavares 
et al., 2007) and p(correct) where available, using Welch’s t-test 
(Supplemental Table S2).
Measures and analyses
RPE task. The choice of gamble was used to determine indi-
vidual risk preference parameter r of their utility functions in the 
form of a parameter of constant relative risk aversion (CRRA; 
e.g. Arrow, 1971; Chiappori and Paiella, 2011). The expected 
utility of a gamble G for any r, given the high and low outcomes 
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The value of r at the indifference point between each pair of 
adjacent gambles was calculated, that is, where the utility of the 
two gambles was equal (EUG = EUG + 1). When individuals chose 
gambles 2–5, the gamble can be considered as chosen over the 
gambles on either side. So, the indifference points mark the upper 
and lower bounds of the individual’s r. With gambles 1 and 6, 
only a lower and upper bound, respectively, are specified. 
Through non-linear interpolation and extrapolation from those 
ranges, a point estimate of r for each participant was determined. 
This was used to calculate expected utilities for the behaviour in 
the mIST.
mIST. We computed a set of measures to index behaviour in this 
task based on and extending Bayesian models of the probability 
of making a correct choice based on information available – a 
measure termed p(correct) in the literature. This measure cap-
tures the fact that the amount of information conveyed by a given 
number of samples can vary depending on what those samples 
reveal. For example, a trial with five samples in a 3:2 split of 
revealed colours conveys much less information about the true 
majority than if all five are of a single colour. Behaviour in line 
with maintaining an acceptable level of risk of an incorrect deci-
sion should therefore be driven by the amount of information 
acquired rather than a set number of samples – taking fewer sam-
ples when the overwhelming majority is one colour compared to 
when they are more mixed. For this reason, p(correct) has been 
considered a more useful quantification of task behaviour than 
sample number in the existing literature (Clark et al., 2006, 2009; 
Delazer et al., 2011; Tavares et al., 2007).
To test formally that participants were guided by the informa-
tional content of samples rather than their quantity, we performed 
an additional analysis to measure the consistency of behaviour 
across trials according to the measures. Consistent behaviour on a 
measure is taken as an indication that participants are more likely 
to be guided by information represented by that measure (e.g. 





r range r value interpolated/
extrapolated
1 £1.15 £1.15 r > 4.28 5.78
2 £1.00 £1.50 2 < r < 4.28 2.97
3 £0.90 £1.80 0.861 < r < 2 1.32
4 £0.80 £2.00 0.382 < r < 0.861 0.61
5 £0.30 £2.90 −0.317 < r < 0.382 0.06
6 £0.05 £3.00 r < −0.317 −0.74
Figure 1. Time course of task.
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p(correct) vs. number of samples). We used coefficients of varia-
tion (CVs), defined as the measure’s ratio of standard deviation to 
its mean within each participant’s data. CVs are used to assess the 
consistency of measure on ratio scales with different mean values 
(Quan and Shih, 1996; Shechtman, 2013). A lower CV indicates 
greater consistency. We computed a CV for each participant on 
each measure (p(correct), expected utility and sample number), 
averaging the former measures across the three prior models 
described in the following paragraph (see Supplemental Table S1). 
We compared CVs of p(correct) and expected utility to CVs of 
sample number using paired t-tests. These tests confirmed the 
appropriate use of p(correct) and expected utility.
We then considered that since there were relatively few trials 
and the distribution was not specified to subjects in advance, 
there is little experience to build up an accurate prior, and the 
discrete structure has few possible outcomes. So, it is feasible for 
participants to keep approximate track of the outcomes, deliber-
ately or otherwise. We sought a principled approach to account-
ing for this possibility in our analysis that did not require a 
complex inference and made minimal assumptions. This was the 
categorical distribution, where observed frequencies of outcomes 
added to the probability mass for the prior of the next decision. 
We refer to this as the learned prior model of choice probability 
and value. To solve the problem of the unknown personal prior 
(i.e. the participant’s personal a priori interpretation of the prob-
ability structure of the task) for the first trial in which no experi-
ence had been gained of the board, data from the first trial were 
excluded from analysis. So, no information or distributional 
assumptions beyond the feedback presented and the current tri-
al’s information set was required.
Evidence has shown that the choice of prior can affect statisti-
cal inferences on data (Bennett et al., 2016). We wished to remain 
agnostic about which priors were held by individuals. So, we also 
computed probabilities for two other established models (exclud-
ing the first trial for all to allow for comparison, as the measure 
was undefined for the learned prior model). In all, we examined 
behaviour using the learned prior model (described above), the 
binomial prior model (Axelsen et al., 2018; Clark et al., 2006) 
and the flat prior model (Bennett et al., 2016). Full details of the 
three models are given in the Supplemental Methods.
Potential rewards were transformed into expected utilities 
(EU) using a utility function with CRRA. As the equation 
required strictly positive inputs, a constant c was also added prior 
to transformation, which was the cost of a sample (the smallest 
unit of outcome). The resulting utilities were then normalised so 
that the utilities of the maximum and minimum possible rewards 































EU reward p correct U reward( ) = ( ) ( ).
To allow for comparison with past studies, we performed sta-
tistical tests on both EU and p(correct) measures, calculating 
each measure for the three prior models. Tests within each group 
were performed in SPSS v25.0 (IBM Corp., Armonk, NY) using 
paired-samples t-tests, and between groups with repeated-meas-
ures analyses of variance (ANOVAs; all two-tailed). A signifi-
cance level of α = 0.05 was used throughout.
To test whether somatic effects of the drugs were potentially a 
source of changing performance, we used the VAS measures and 
mediation analyses. Details are given in the Supplemental Material.
Results
Self-report VAS measures
There was a small but significant difference in the nausea scale 
between drug and placebo conditions for atomoxetine and a differ-
ence on the threshold of significance for citalopram, corresponding 
to a change of 3.9 (citalopram)/6.6 (atomoxetine) on a 100-point 
scale. We conducted a supplementary mediation analysis to deter-
mine whether the change in nausea might account for effects of 
drugs on the dependent measures of the mIST. Changes of nausea 
did not predict any mIST-dependent measure, and all mediation 
effects via nausea were non-significant. There were no significant 
differences between the two drugs in drug–placebo differences. 
See Supplemental Material for full details of these analyses.
RPE task
The results of the RPE (Table 2) show that 20 out of 27 partici-
pants in the citalopram group and 15 out of 22 participants in the 
atomoxetine group showed a degree of risk aversion (choosing 
gambles 1–4), while three and two, respectively, were approxi-
mately risk neutral (gamble 5) and four and five, respectively, 
were risk seeking (gamble 6). Weighted mean gambles were 3.11 
for the citalopram group and 3.77 for the atomoxetine, indicating 
a baseline (pre-dose effect) preference for slightly higher risk in 
the atomoxetine group. However, Fisher’s exact test showed that 
the difference in proportions of each gamble choice between the 
groups was not significant (p = 0.37).
mIST
The CV was lower for both p(correct) and expected utility than 
for the number of samples in both drug and placebo conditions 
(see Supplemental Material for details). This indicated that par-
ticipants used the information within samples rather than the 
number of samples to guide behaviour.
Average p(correct) and number of samples taken on the mIST 
was similar to prior studies. Specific values of p(correct) in previ-
ous studies was only available in one paper by Clark et al. (2009), 
with other papers using the measure in statistical analyses and dis-
playing results in chart form. Clark et al. found a similar p(correct) 
value (using a binomial prior) in the healthy control group to the 
equivalent mean placebo value (also binomial prior) across both 
drug groups in our study (this study: M = 0.720, SD = 0.054; Clark 
et al., 2009: M = 0.74, SD = 0.06; t(30.03) = −1.27, p = 0.21). The 
mean sample number was 8.37 (SD = 3.89), which was not signifi-
cantly different to the weighted mean of previous studies 
(Mweighted = 8.84, pooled SD = 3.83; t(81.1) = 0.74, p = 0.46; details 
of included studies are given in Supplemental Table S2).
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We transformed each participant’s decision utilities using 
equations 1–3, with the individual implied utility function param-
eters computed from the RPE task used as the participant’s r 
parameter. These were computed separately using the three prob-
ability models: binomial prior, flat prior and learned prior. 
Treatment order and sex were tested for effects on all dependent 
measures. Neither showed significance or trend significance 
when tested as a between-subjects factor for any group compari-
sons, and so they were excluded from the final analysis.
The three expected utility derivations were highly correlated 
(corr(EUlearned, EUflat) = 0.950, corr(EUlearned, EUbinomial) = 0.980, 
corr(EUflat, EUbinomial) = 0.970; all p < 0.001). Comparing within-
subjects means of each score by drug treatment, significant differ-
ences were shown between placebo and citalopram for all three 
prior models of expected utility (Table 3). This provided strong 
rejection of the null hypothesis of no drug effect. In each case, the 
mean expected utility of decisions made under citalopram was 
lower than that of those made under placebo. By contrast, those 
between placebo and atomoxetine were non-significant (Table 4). 
These results are shown in Figure 2. An ANOVA across both sets 
of data, with drug group as a between-subjects factor and drug ses-
sion as a within-subjects factor, also showed a significant drug 
group × session interaction on learned and flat prior models, and 
trend significance on the binomial prior model (Table 5).
To compare findings with previous research and understand 
the causes of utility shifts demonstrated better, we also tested 
mean probabilities of correct choice at decision time between 
drug and placebo for each model (p(correct); Clark et al., 2006). 
Pairwise t-tests showed significant differences between placebo 
and citalopram for learned and flat prior models – probabilities of 
correct decisions were lower under citalopram than placebo. The 
binomial prior model showed the same trend, although not reach-
ing significance at the 0.05 level. It should be noted that the 
assumptions of the binomial prior model are not fully met in this 
variant of the IST, as the true underlying distribution of probabili-
ties for each trial follow a truncated uniform distribution, as 
shown in the Methods. Once again, for atomoxetine, there were 
no significant differences, while the trend differences were in the 
opposite direction from citalopram.
Finally, we looked at the numbers of samples chosen and pro-
portion of erroneous decisions, the latter defined as decisions 
choosing the minority colour or where the numbers of both col-
ours were equal (as in this situation, taking an extra sample would 
increase expected utility). These are shown in Supplemental 
Table S4. There were no significant effects from either drug.
Discussion
Acute serotonin reuptake inhibition reduced the expected utility 
of choices and probability of correct decisions in an information 
sampling context. Models showed similar effect sizes regardless 
of choice of model prior, and the effect on expected utility and 
Table 2. Numbers and proportions of participants choosing each gamble in the RPE task.
Gamble Citalopram Number of choices Proportion of sample
Atomoxetine Total Citalopram Atomoxetine Total
1 5 0 5 0.19 0 0.10
2 9 7 16 0.33 0.32 0.33
3 2 3 5 0.07 0.14 0.10
4 4 5 9 0.15 0.23 0.18
5 3 2 5 0.11 0.09 0.10
6 4 5 9 0.15 0.23 0.18
RPE: risk preference elicitation.
Table 3. Results of within-subject comparisons of drug and placebo conditions for the citalopram group.
Statistic Expected utility p(correct)
 Placebo Drug Placebo Drug
Learned prior M (SD) 0.672 (0.133) 0.633 (0.149) 0.758 (0.069) 0.723 (0.074)
t-stat (df = 26) 2.88 2.37
p 0.008** 0.025*
Cohen’s d 0.55 0.46
Flat prior M (SD) 0.737 (0.142) 0.701 (0.157) 0.830 (0.052) 0.800 (0.067)
t-stat (df = 26) 2.49 2.33
p 0.019* 0.028*
Cohen’s d 0.48 0.45
Binomial prior M (SD) 0.648 (0.13) 0.619 (0.14) 0.731 (0.061) 0.709 (0.074)
t-stat (df = 26) 2.59 1.87
p 0.015* 0.073†
Cohen’s d 0.50 0.36
**p < 0.01; *p < 0.05; †p < 0.1.
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probabilities were of similar magnitude. These effects were not 
observed following similar inhibition of the noradrenaline trans-
porter, despite a similar historical side-effect profile of the 
treatments.
The modified task removes effects of temporal impulsivity 
and likely reduces effects of loss aversion. Risk preference was 
shown to be non-neutral from the RPE task in all but 5 out of 49 
participants across the two groups, demonstrating the importance 
of the expected utility approach, which incorporates risk aver-
sion, for modelling task behaviour. By computing individually 
parameterised expected utilities, our analysis allowed us to deter-
mine that the subjective value of decisions made under citalo-
pram challenge was lower than those under placebo. This 
measure provides a stronger indication of changes to the effec-
tiveness of sampling decisions than a probability measure alone, 
as it incorporates an independent measure of how individuals 
value certainty of reward. Additionally, by computing utility 
changes for three prior models representing feasible (but 
unknown) ways that participants may perceive the task contin-
gencies, we demonstrate that this reduction occurs regardless of 
model choice and avoid the possibility of statistical inferences 
being biased by this unknown factor. We also computed and com-
pared behaviour using the original p(correct) measure across the 
three prior models in order to facilitate comparisons with the 
existing literature and to demonstrate that the effect was reason-
ably robust without incorporating baseline risk aversion. Finally, 
the development of a new model with updating priors allows for 
the possibility that repeated trials may cause learning of task con-
tingencies, and places minimal assumptions on this process.
Using a clinical dose of citalopram, we extend the findings of 
Crockett et al. (2012) and further our understanding of seroto-
nin’s role in reflection impulsivity in the context of information 
sampling. The expected utility of choices and probability of 
being correct was lower on a clinical dose of citalopram, indicat-
ing a reduced tendency to be satisfied with an optimal amount of 
information to make a choice. This was consistent (maintaining 
significance or trend throughout) across the three tested models 
of participant priors, that is, whether participants maintained an 
unchanging assumption that the true distribution of numbers of 
colours was binomial or uniform, or if they learned and updated 
their prior with repeated trials. This finding does not appear to be 
driven by a simple strategy to take greater chances for a higher 
reward, which would have manifested in taking fewer samples. 
Instead, it indicates that citalopram alters another route to the use 
of sampled information. An example of this would be a lowered 
ability to adapt the number of samples taken to the Bayesian 
probability of correctness, given the information set. Alternatively, 
it could be due to an increased appetite for risk, based on infor-
mation content. However, previous research with acute citalo-
pram did not demonstrate changes in risk appetite on a gambling 
task (Macoveanu et al., 2013).
The effect of citalopram may be presynaptic or postsynaptic 
influences on serotonin at the synapse. Acute citalopram block-
ade of the serotonin transporter not only increases postsynaptic 
serotonin levels (David et al., 2003; Moret and Briley, 1996), but 
also increases serotonin availability at presynaptic autoreceptors 
that inhibit further release (Chaput et al., 1986; El Mansari et al., 
2005; Nord et al., 2013). A clear consensus on the net effect has 
not been established. In our results, the effect of citalopram on 
decision probability was consistent with, and in the opposite 
direction to, that of ATD, as demonstrated by Crockett et al. By 
this, the effect may be postsynaptic enhancement of serotonin’s 
influence. However, ATD effects on learning tasks are not always 
the opposite effect of that observed by SRIs (Kanen et al., 2020).
There are alternative explanations, supporting a presynaptic 
account. Research by Chamberlain et al. (2006) and Skandali 
et al. (2018) showed probabilistic learning deficits from acute 
Table 4. Results of within-subject comparisons of drug and placebo conditions for the atomoxetine group.
Statistic Expected utility p(correct)
 Placebo Drug Placebo Drug
Learned prior M (SD) 0.606 (0.118) 0.614 (0.166) 0.718 (0.051) 0.735 (0.076)
t-stat (df = 21) −0.23 −1.07
p 0.82 0.30
Cohen’s d −0.05 −0.23
Flat prior M (SD) 0.690 (0.127) 0.683 (0.167) 0.815 (0.035) 0.817 (0.063)
t-stat (df = 21) 0.40 −0.28
p 0.70 0.78
Cohen’s d 0.09 −0.06
Binomial prior M (SD) 0.597 (0.112) 0.6 (0.149) 0.708 (0.041) 0.721 (0.072)
t-stat (df = 21) −0.26 −1.2
p 0.80 0.25
Cohen’s d −0.06 −0.26
Table 5. Results of interaction of condition and drug type between 
groups.
Statistic Expected utility p(correct)
Learned prior F(1, 47) 4.73 5.98
p 0.035* 0.018*
Flat prior F(1, 47) 4.26 3.26
p 0.045* 0.078†
Binomial prior F(1, 47) 3.68 4.41
p 0.061† 0.041*
*p < 0.05; †p <0.1.
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citalopram and escitalopram, where misleading feedback (i.e. 
feedback not in line with current contingencies, such as a loss 
when contingencies give rewards with 80% probability) was 
more likely to cause a shift of action than would be optimal. They 
posit that presynaptic serotonin autoreceptor activity may be 
responsible. Complementing this interpretation, Lottem et al. 
(2018) showed that activation of serotonergic neurons during for-
aging in mice promote exploitation of a rewarding patch rather 
than exploration of an alternative action. From a perspective of 
task switching and information gathering, our results are consist-
ent with this presynaptic interpretation. Though the prepotent 
behaviour is to exploit in these studies and explore in the present, 
one speculative cohesive explanation may lie in covariation of 
serotonin activity and the amount of information required to 
instigate switch behaviour (from explore to exploit or vice versa). 
ATD studies of loss-chasing behaviour are consistent with this, 
where ATD increases switching out a sequence of gambles (and 
thereby accept the accumulated loss; Campbell-Meiklejohn 
et al., 2011). Serotonin may reduce the threshold required to 
switch or bias the calculation of choice utility (thereby suggest-
ing a threshold has been reached earlier). To probe the presynap-
tic or postsynaptic mechanisms further and understand ATD 
effects on decision utility, a follow-up study using ATD with our 
methodology, as well as a study of longer-term treatment whereby 
post-synaptic effects dominate, would be beneficial.
While this study used single doses and was conducted on a 
healthy population, it nonetheless characterises the effects of the 
early stages of SRI treatment. Major depressive disorder itself 
presents with increased measures of reflection impulsivity 
(Tavares et al., 2007), and the issue becomes particularly perti-
nent where individuals show behaviours or co-morbidities with 
further effects on information sampling, such as the use of can-
nabis, amphetamines or opiates (Clark et al., 2006, 2009) and 
sufferers of narcolepsy with cataplexy (Delazer et al., 2011). If 
effects of SRI treatment on information sampling manifest simi-
larly in these populations, this could lead to a possible additive 
effect and accentuate existing biases in the early stages of treat-
ment. The longer-term clinical effects may depend on whether 
these effects of SRIs are sustained. Further research with chronic 
treatment and clinical populations would be needed to under-
stand the clinical implications better.
Our null findings with atomoxetine are consistent with the 
Chamberlain et al. (2006) study. They showed that atomoxetine 
reduces motor impulsivity (failure to inhibit unwanted or prema-
ture motor actions), in line with noradrenergic and prefrontal dopa-
mine influences on brain areas responsible for inhibitory signalling. 
Other research showed that atomoxetine reduces temporal impul-
sivity or delay discounting (choice of a smaller immediate reward 
over a larger delayed reward; Bizot et al., 2011). Both are distinct 
impulsivity subtypes dissociable from reflection impulsivity 
(Caswell et al., 2015). By contrast, directed exploratory decisions 
in the mIST task to seek out information for future gain are more 
deliberative, and the temporal aspect of reward delay was removed 
by design. While care must be taken in interpreting null results for 
atomoxetine, our results support a proposition that the distinction 
between these impulsivity types may be a pharmacological one.
Limitations
A few limitations of the study design should be noted. The assign-
ment to citalopram and atomoxetine studies was not randomised 
owing to data collection in independent experiments. Data were 
only blinded between placebo and drug conditions, not between 
the two experiments. This leads to the possibility that the two 
samples had characteristics that differed, aside from balanced age 
and sex. While effect sizes were convincing and benefited from 
within-subject designs, future studies and determination of clini-
cal significance would benefit from a larger sample size.
The within-subjects design was chosen to orthogonalise any 
differences in the subject population from the effect of drug 
manipulation. A benefit is that drug comparisons are sensitive to 
effects that may be relevant to an individual, despite being small 
relative to variation across the population. Indeed, differences in 
placebo between the two groups were larger than the effect of 
citalopram. The atomoxetine group (compared to the citalopram 
group) showed, on trend, greater baseline risk seeking and lower 
baseline p(correct) and expected utility measures on the IST. 
This should be considered when interpreting effects in terms of 
variation of information sampling across a population.
The inclusion of the RPE measure was to account for risk 
aversion in our analysis of the IST. However, it was only meas-






































Figure 2. Expected utilities and probability of correct response under learned prior model. Error bars are ±1 standard error of the mean.
**p <0.01.
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IST choices could involve effects on tolerance to risk that were 
not captured in our study. Delineating effects on risk aversion 
from effects on the efficient use of sampled information would 
require a sensitive measure of risk aversion that could detect dif-
ferences of risk aversion on and off the drug.
Conclusion
We provide the first demonstration that a single dose of an SRI 
can impact information sampling, reflected in the utility of result-
ing decisions and probability of being correct. The findings of 
altered decision making with respect to optimal belief formation 
adds to our view of early-stage serotonergic treatment effects on 
exploration and choice. In a world where ever-growing quantities 
of information are available, an important choice is the choice to 
stop sampling and use the information at hand. Research on this 
decision continues to help us better understand the biology of 
choices in uncertain but information-rich environments. It is 
becoming ever clearer that serotonin plays a role in the shift from 
sampling the world to making a choice.
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